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Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering 1
Steven L. Schwarcz2
Abstract: This article attempts to explain empirically the value that
lawyers add when acting as counsel to parties in business transactions.
Contrary to existing scholarship, which is based mostly on theory, this
article shows that transactional lawyers add value primarily by reducing
regulatory costs, thereby challenging the reigning models of transactional
lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” and “reputational
intermediaries.” This new model not only helps inform contract theory but
also reveals a profoundly different vision than those of existing models for
the future of legal education and the profession.

INTRODUCTION
Everyone understands the value of lawyers as litigators, but for decades scholars
have attempted to explain what value lawyers add in their quintessential role as counsel
to parties in the negotiating, contract drafting, and opinion-giving process3 leading to
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2
“closing”4 a commercial, financing, or other business transaction (lawyers performing
this role being referred to hereinafter as “transactional lawyers” or “transactional
counsel”5).6 To date, however, the scholarship reflects mostly pure theory, occasionally
tempered by isolated anecdotes.7 Perhaps as a result, its findings are both overly broad
and incomplete.
Professors Gilson, Mnookin, and Gardner argue, for example, that transactional
lawyers add value primarily by reducing transaction costs, acting as reputational
intermediaries, anticipating and counseling clients about risks and outcomes, identifying
differences in valuation between parties, and creating economies of scope.8 To a large
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A “closing” is the final stage of a business transaction when the documents and
agreements are signed (and, as appropriate, filed with requisite government agencies) and
the transaction is then funded or otherwise effectuated.
5
This article focuses on external, as opposed to in-house, transactional lawyers—that is,
transactional lawyers within independent law firms. Although law firms continue to
dominate sophisticated transactional work (see Appendix A, infra, at B.3, indicating that
most clients seriously consider hiring law firms for transactions that are complex,
unusual, or involve large dollar amounts), in-house legal departments in recent years have
grown in reputation and skill. The value provided by in-house lawyers as transactional
counsel, and the extent to which that value might be different from the value provided by
external transactional lawyers, are possible issues for further study. Cf. Appendix A,
infra, at B.1 (showing that transactional lawyers have a somewhat higher opinion than
clients of the extent to which a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a
transaction, perhaps indicating that general counsel with confidence in their own staff do
not see as much of a need to hire high reputation firms for transactional work). See also
Steven L. Schwarcz, “To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation”
(Jan. 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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(Peter Newman, ed. 1998) (focusing on “lawyers providing non-litigation services to
clients engaged in business activities”). Any value that transactional lawyers may provide
as litigation counsel is beyond this article’s scope.
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The seminal work is Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239 (1984). See also Seminar, Business Lawyers and
Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 et seq. (1995).
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(2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1995).
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extent, however—as Professor Gilson himself acknowledges9—this represents the same
types of value that could be added in business transactions by any sophisticated
negotiating party, not necessarily one specially trained as a lawyer.10 For example, as key
players in most business transactions, investment bankers appear equally capable of
identifying differences in valuation between parties, reducing transaction costs, acting as
reputational intermediaries, anticipating (at least non-legal) risks and outcomes, and
developing economies of scope.11 Unless transactional lawyers add significant value in
their capacity as lawyers, their utility would be questionable if not fungible.
This article challenges existing scholarship by attempting to discover empirically
what value transactional lawyers actually provide. The empirical findings suggest that
transactional lawyers create significant value in their capacity as lawyers in ways that
have been underestimated by scholars and that may have profound significance to the
future of the profession and of legal education.
METHODOLOGY
The article utilizes quantitative data to test a range of hypotheses, including
hypotheses advanced under the existing scholarship, about how transactional lawyers in
law firms might provide value.12 These data derive from the results of e-mail surveys
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Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 295 (“There is nothing
traditionally ‘legal’ about the role I have described business lawyers as playing, nor are
there any special requirements peculiar to lawyers necessary to play this role.”). See also
Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 44–45 (1995)
(proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational intermediaries).
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See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 616–21 (1984) (describing the role of the investment banker in
distributing securities).
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See supra note 5 (noting this article’s focus on independent, as opposed to in-house,
transactional lawyers). The focus on law firms means that the transactions at issue will
tend to be those that are complex, unusual, or involve large dollar amounts. Cf. infra note
16 (indicating the practice areas examined).
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with transactional lawyers and their clients.13 The surveys were conducted using fourpage questionnaires, one prepared for lawyers and a slightly modified version prepared
for clients.14 The client questionnaires served as a control, to help reveal any areas where
lawyer perceptions of their value might not be shared by clients and thus might be
inaccurate.
The lawyer questionnaire included twenty-six questions, and the client
questionnaire twenty-seven questions, in each case divided into sections based on the
hypotheses discussed below.15 Forms of these questionnaires are annexed as Addenda 1
(Lawyer Questionnaire) and 2 (Client Questionnaire). The lawyer questionnaire was sent
to a representative sampling of transactional lawyers,16 and the client questionnaire was
sent to a representative sampling of clients.17 Approximately eight percent of these
lawyers and four percent of these clients responded.18
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Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002)
(observing that empirical data “may be … the results of interviews or surveys”).
14
See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
16
Lawyer questionnaires were sent to 500 lawyers in New York City, 211 lawyers in
Philadelphia, and 270 lawyers in Chicago, cities selected to represent major and regional
money centers in the United States. Respondents were selected randomly using a random
number generator from a list of lawyers generated from the LexisNexis® MartindaleHubbell® Lawyer Locator. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study
of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 10711 (1994) (using a similar sampling method). To qualify to receive a survey, the lawyer
must concentrate the majority of his or her practice in corporate transactional work
(including mergers and acquisitions (M&A), securities law, corporate finance, project
finance, or structured finance) and be a partner or counsel at a law firm with at least fifty
lawyers that is listed in the NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS.
17
We initially e-mailed client questionnaires to the general counsel at 165 financial
services or Fortune 500 companies. Some additional responses were obtained by emailing client questionnaires to former clients of the author and to Duke Law School
alumni working at companies. The relevant text of the e-mail to which all questionnaires
were attached is as follows: “[W]e have attached a short (4-page) questionnaire, which
should take only a few minutes to complete. We would be grateful for your response or,
if you prefer, the response of a colleague (or colleagues) in the legal department. The
transactional areas on which we are focusing are securities offerings, M&A, commercial
lending, and structured and project finance. / In addition, it would be especially useful to
ascertain whether non-lawyers at your company have different perspectives on how law
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The hypotheses tested by these questionnaires are intended to represent all
plausible hypotheses for how transactional lawyers might add value.19 This article does
not assume, however, that transactional lawyers in fact add value; it merely asks—if they
do—how would that value be supplied?
This begs the questions: What constitutes value, and value to whom? By “value,”
this article essentially means monetary value.20 This would include not only lowering
direct costs but also indirectly saving costs, such as reducing the time and effort that
parties need to devote to a business transaction.21 Value also may include less tangible
(and thus less quantifiable) factors, such as employing an experienced lawyer to increase
client confidence and reduce anxiety.
As to the second question (value to whom?), the most obvious potential recipient
of value is the client. For this reason, as well as to serve as a control,22 the article also
surveys clients of transactional lawyers. The article takes a broad societal perspective,
however, and does not focus on value creation from the standpoint of any single client.

firms add value in business transactions. We therefore would appreciate your sharing the
questionnaire with one or more of your non-legal colleagues who work closely with
outside counsel in the transactional areas mentioned above, and would be grateful for
their responses.”
18
There were 75 lawyer responses to 981 solicitations, and 17 client responses to 427
solicitations. The lower “client” response rate as well as the fact that some of those
responses included former clients of the author or Duke Law School alumni (see supra
note 17) make the client responses less random, and thus arguably less reliable, than the
lawyer responses.
19
See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text (setting forth these hypotheses and
explaining their derivation).
20
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 243 (arguing that if a
transactional lawyer adds value, the transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, as
a result of the lawyer’s participation). Cf. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977) (defining value as “human satisfaction as measured by aggregate
consumer willingness to pay for goods and services”).
21
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 254 (equating “costsaving” with “value creation”).
22
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Even if a clever lawyer is able to negotiate a better deal for her client than a less clever
lawyer can negotiate for his, that would not increase but would merely reallocate overall
value in a zero-sum game.23
The foregoing methodology, of course, has potential flaws. Although they
constitute “a primary source of data in . . . the social sciences,”24 surveys have inherent
limitations, such as being dependent on the precise wording, format, and context of the
survey questions.25 Survey data also indicate, in this case, what transactional lawyers and
their clients say the former do, which may be different from what transactional lawyers
actually do. Transactional lawyers, for example, may view their roles as more important
and indispensable than they actually are.26
For survey purposes, the article also treats the general counsel—or, where
applicable, a person to whom the general counsel forwards the survey to respond—as a
proxy for the client-company, even though non-lawyers sometimes might have different
views of how transactional lawyers add value in business transactions. This was done
because initial research indicated that non-lawyer clients would be very unlikely to
respond directly to the questionnaires. All general counsel were asked, however, to share
the questionnaire with one or more of their non-legal colleagues who work closely with
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Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 244-45. This article
therefore does not examine the allocative role of transactional lawyers to try to get their
clients the greatest slice of the value “pie.”
24
Norbert Schwarz, Self Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 AM.
PSYCHOLOGISt 93, 93 (Feb. 1999).
25
Id. (observing that surveys are a “fallible source of data [in that] minor changes in
question wording, question format, or question context can result in major changes in the
obtained results”).
26
See, e.g., Robert E. Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 638 (2002) (“The self-reports of elite actors, like lawyers,
are especially suspect, for often they are speeches to an audience (other than the
interviewer).”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Lawyers, Law and Contract Formation, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2748, 2749-50 (2000) (discussing this tendency from the standpoint of lawyer
self-reporting).
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outside counsel in the transactional areas of interest, in order to ascertain whether nonlawyers have different perspectives on how such counsel add value.27
Furthermore, the low response rates to the questionnaires28 may signal potential
biases, since “nonresponse often is not random.”29 For example, the transactional lawyers
who responded may have been more intellectually curious about this project than nonrespondents; or those respondents may have been, on average, less busy—and therefore
perhaps less competent lawyers—than non-respondents. Without denying the possibility
of some such bias, the relatively small deviations in the lawyer-respondents’ answers and
the high degree of correlation among this survey’s city-by-city data mitigated somewhat
against the existence of bias.30 Moreover, transactional lawyers tend to be extremely
busy, and the author’s expectations going into this project was that response rates would
not exceed 10%—remarkably close to the actual response rate.31
Because of these and other potential limitations,32 this article occasionally
attempts to explain and add perspective to the quantitative data by utilizing qualitative
data in the form of “evidence about the world [of transactional lawyering] based on

27

See supra note 17.
See text accompanying note 18, supra, indicating approximate response rates of eight
percent for lawyers and four percent for clients.
29
See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 245 (2d ed. 2000) (Fed. Jud. Center).
30
The uniformity of these data do not, of course, rule out the possibility that all
respondents were similarly biased.
31
Although the client sampling was theoretically biased in that no attempt was made to
distinguish clients who use lawyers for transactional work and clients who do not
(indeed, all client respondents fell into the first category), any such bias should be
minimal since the types of corporate transactional work this article examines (see supra
note 16) almost always involves lawyers.
32
See supra note 18 (observing potential limitations in the client responses). Other
potential limitations to this article’s methodology include that transactional lawyers were
identified through the imprecise practice-area categories in Martindale-Hubbell (see
supra note 16, listing those categories as M&A, securities law, corporate finance, project
finance, and structured finance), and that law firms and clients were matched, based on
these listings, using educated guesses.
28
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observation [and] experience,”33 deriving largely from the author’s twenty-two years of
observations and experiences as a transactional lawyer.34 The use of qualitative data is
equally “empirical” as the use of quantitative data.35
The results of the survey data are consistent with these observations and
experiences, indicating such data do indeed show what transactional lawyers actually do.
This is not to say that these results are infallible, merely that—because a “truly empirical
approach to measuring the impact of a business lawyer’s participation seems
impossible”36—survey results may be as close a proxy as feasible to showing what
transactional lawyers actually do.
HYPOTHESES
In accordance with the foregoing methodology, this article tests the hypotheses
that transactional lawyers add value by (1) minimizing the potential for ex post litigation;
(2) reducing transaction costs; (3) reducing regulatory costs37; (4) acting as reputational
intermediaries; (5) providing client privilege and confidentiality; (6) creating economies
of scope. These hypotheses—representing what appears to be all plausible hypotheses for
how transactional lawyers might add value—were compiled from scholarly literature,
practitioner literature, transactional lawyer feedback on draft questionnaires, and
experience. None of these hypotheses is necessarily mutually exclusive of others. To the
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See Epstein & King, The Rules of Inference, supra note 13, at 2 (observing that
“empirical research, as natural and social scientists recognize, … denotes [not only
quantitative data but also] evidence about the world based on observation or
experience”).
34
The author represented clients in transactions involving corporate finance, structured
finance, and securities law from 1974 through 1989 as an associate and then partner at the
law firm of Shearman & Sterling and from 1989 through 1996 as partner and chairman of
the Structured Finance Practice Group at the Kaye Scholer law firm.
35
Epstein & King, The Rules of Inference, supra note 13, at 2 (observing that “neither
[quantitative nor qualitative observation about the world] is any more ‘empirical’ than the
other”).
36
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 247-48.
37
In conversations with the author, Professor Victor Fleischer has referred to at least an
aspect of this function of lawyers as “regulatory cost engineering.”
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extent transactional lawyers add value, they might do so through a combination of these
hypotheses.
Each of these hypotheses is further explained below.
1. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by minimizing the
potential for ex post litigation. This hypothesis predicts that lawyers add value to
transactions by anticipating and minimizing the likelihood that failure of the transaction
will result in litigation.
2. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing transaction
costs. Under this hypothesis, transactional lawyers reduce certain transaction costs,
thereby increasing the size of the pie for all parties.38 They reduce moral hazard, for
example, by drafting transaction documents and agreements to eliminate adverse actions
due to changes in incentives. Thus, if the purchase price of a capital asset in an M&A
transaction is adjusted based on buyer’s revenues in the year following the sale, the
seller’s transactional lawyer could negotiate and draft the contract so as to eliminate the
buyer’s incentive to increase current costs (and thereby adjust the purchase price
downward).39 This hypothesis also predicts that transactional lawyers reduce agency
costs by implicitly monitoring (as independent advocates for their client’s position) that
their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf40 and that they effectively reduce
asymmetric information by giving legal opinions.41

38

Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 246. Professor Gilson
refers to lawyers acting in this capacity as “transaction cost engineers.” Id. at 253-55.
39
Id. at 255.
40
Cf. id. at 292, 298.
41
Id. at 275, 291-92 (arguing that, in M&A transactions, transactional lawyers use their
position as third-party intermediaries in a repeat-transactional world to give detached
opinions on the state of the capital changing hands).
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Although complying with law might be broadly viewed as a cost of engaging in a
transaction, the relevant literature does not generally include legal compliance as a
transaction cost.42 It is therefore discussed as a separate hypothesis, below.
3. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory
costs. In its narrow form, this hypothesis predicts that transactional lawyers add value by
understanding their clients’ regulatory concerns, thereby being able to negotiate deals
without compromising regulatory compliance.43 This “client-regulatory” legal work
involves understanding the law and regulation that bind the client, qua client.
Because most clients, just like most companies, are not highly regulated (if
regulated at all),44 this article posits a broader hypothesis, distinguishing between clientregulatory legal work and “transaction-regulatory” legal work. Transaction-regulatory
legal work involves understanding the law and regulation that govern the particular type
of transaction, irrespective of the regulatory concerns of the client engaging in the
transaction. As an example of this distinction, consider a typical legal opinion,
concluding (among other things) that an agreement is enforceable according to its terms
and that performance thereof would not violate law.45 In rendering this opinion,
transactional counsel would be performing client-regulatory legal work to the extent
counsel’s conclusion goes to no violation of law, and would be performing transactionregulatory legal work to the extent the conclusion goes to enforceability of the agreement
qua agreement.

42

See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 6 (asserting
that transactional lawyers “must play an important role in designing the structure of the
transaction in order to assure the desired regulatory treatment”).
44
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
45
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35-36 & 55-56 (2005). See also infra note 81 and accompanying text
(discussing legal opinions).
43
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Whereas literature to date examines only client-regulatory legal work, this article
also examines transaction-regulatory legal work as a possible source of transactional
lawyer value.
4. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational
intermediaries. Under this hypothesis, as repeat players in the transactional world,
transactional lawyers add value by renting their good reputation to clients. If, for
example, a particular law firm is well known for representing underwriters selling
securities, the hypothesis predicts that underwriter-clients, by using that firm, signal a
measure of reliability and soundness to potential investors in those securities. The highreputation law firm not only has expertise but, more importantly, bonds itself to good
performance; it would lose at least part of its reputation if it failed to perform well. In this
regard, reputation appears to be a more effective “bond” than liability because
professional negligence is hard to prove46 and, when proved, is usually covered by
insurance.47 The hypothesis also predicts that hiring a high-reputation law firm adds even
greater value when the client does not already have a high reputation (e.g., is not a repeat
player) in a type of transaction.
This hypothesis appears to be the most agreed upon scholarly theory of the value
added by transactional lawyers.48

46

See, e.g., Krista M. Enns, Note, Can A California Litigant Prevail in an Action for
Legal Malpractice Based on an Attorney’s Oral Argument Before the United States
Supreme Court?, 48 DUKE L.J. 111, 146 (1998) (arguing that in legal malpractice actions
“causation is so difficult to prove that litigants are likely to fail”); John H. Bauman,
Damages For Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal Of The Crumbling Dike And The
Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1988).
47
Although law firms presumably could make liability more of a “bond” by taking high
insurance deductibles and advertising that to potential clients, one does not observe this
in practice. Cf. Robert Ceniceros, Third-party Liability Threat to Lawyers Grows, BUS.
INS., Nov. 14, 2005 at 16 (observing that law firms disfavor high insurance deductibles
and accept such deductibles only where forced to do so by insurance market constraints).
48
See e.g., Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century, supra
note 8, at 46-48; Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, supra note 9, at 43.
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5. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by providing client
privilege and confidentiality. According to this hypothesis, lawyers add value by
providing clients with a measure of privilege and confidentiality. Clients gain these
protections through the attorney-client privilege: a lawyer’s work product, including
correspondence with clients in preparing for a deal, may be privileged under applicable
state law.49 Thus, a client may be able to communicate through its lawyers without
revealing confidential matters to opposing parties.
6. The hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by creating economies of
scope. Economies of scope represent the savings resulting from having the same
investment support multiple profitable activities less expensively in combination than
separately.50 Because transactional lawyers already play a legal role in transactions, this
hypothesis predicts that “economies of scope should give them an advantage in
performing the [non-legal] aspects of transaction structuring as well.”51
According to this hypothesis, non-legal jobs include negotiation and drafting of
deal documentation, identifying differences in valuation, reducing transaction costs, and
engaging in due diligence. This hypothesis predicts, for example, that although a nonlawyer scrivener could instead negotiate and draft deal documentation, a lawyer would
still be needed to review the documentation from a legal standpoint. Having the
reviewing lawyer also do the negotiation and drafting creates the economy of scope.
In examining this hypothesis, it is important to distinguish economies of scope
from economies of scale. The latter represents the savings resulting from the greater

49

See Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633-49 (1997) (giving a state by
state look at the corporate attorney-client privilege, and noting the uncertainty of the
contours of the privilege in most states).
50
CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, HYPERTEXTUAL FINANCE GLOSSARY, available at
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglose.htm (visited Nov. 23, 2005).
51
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 298.

13
efficiency of large-scale processes.52 Transactional lawyers can and do create economies
of scale, such as by counseling multiple transactions of a given type, thereby
apportioning the cost of gaining experience and expertise. Although that adds value, it is
not value that is unique to transactional lawyering: any party who advises on multiple
transactions of a given type could add similar value. For that reason, and since economies
of scale are not singled out in the literature as a source of transactional lawyer value, this
article does not separately test whether transactional lawyers add value by creating
economies of scale. To some extent, however, that value is implicit in certain of this
article’s other hypotheses. For example, transactional lawyers should better perform
transaction-regulatory legal work by counseling multiple transactions, should better
perform client-regulatory legal work by counseling multiple clients subject to the same
regulatory framework, and should be better reputational intermediaries by engaging in
repeat transactions.
More marginal ways in which transactional lawyers may add value. In addition
to the foregoing hypotheses, transactional lawyers may add value in more marginal ways.
From a behavioral-psychology standpoint, for example, transactional lawyers—by
training if not also by the temperament of many who go into the legal profession,
especially those who avoid being litigators—are likely to be more risk averse than their
business clients.53 These lawyers therefore may provide a sounding board to help clients
balance risk-prone ideas. Transactional lawyers also might add value by enhancing the
perception of social ordering: society has a fundamental need for order, and lawyers are
the priests who provide the order through law, granting confidence and authority to
transactions. 54 Transactional lawyers additionally can add value to the client by
52

HARVEY, HYPERTEXTUAL FINANCE GLOSSARY, supra note 50.
See, e.g., Susan R. Helper, Symposium, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge
and Controlling Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 931 (2003) (arguing
lawyers and economists are both very “risk averse”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 375, 379 (1997) (predicting “systematic overstatement of risk is a
robust, if not universal, phenomenon in the legal profession”).
54
For example, the Noachide laws commanded mankind to establish courts of justice and
a just social order. See Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra 22b, translated in Babylonian
53
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providing a measure of risk-shifting, in that the client might have a claim against the
lawyer if the transaction results in losses. Any such claim would succeed, however, only
if the lawyer was negligent in failing to protect against the losses, and clients should be
able to insure more efficiently in other ways against bad outcomes.55 Furthermore, this
reallocation in overall value is not the type of value on which this article focuses.56
This article tests only the first six hypotheses. It does not systematically attempt to
test the more marginal ways in which transactional lawyers might add value.57
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Set forth below are this article’s empirical findings. The data underlying these
findings are presented in detail in Appendix A.58 As the analysis shows, these findings
contrast starkly in many cases with scholarly theory.
1. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by
minimizing the potential for ex post litigation. The findings partly support the first
hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by minimizing the potential for ex post
litigation. Most lawyer-respondents and client-respondents agree that this is one of the
primary goals that lawyers drafting contracts should seek to accomplish.59 Still, litigation
is so rare that this role of lawyers might appear to add relatively modest value. On

Talmud, Baba Bathra 22b (I. Epstein trans. & ed., 1960); see also Rene David, Two
Conceptions of Social Order, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 136, 140 (1983).
55
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 (2000).
56
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
57
Thus, although the data in Appendix A hereto, at C.8, indicate that clients do not
significantly look to transactional lawyers for third-party objectivity, such data do not
systematically probe whether clients use such lawyers as sounding boards to help balance
risk-prone ideas.
58
Appendix A does not break down the data as among the categories of corporate
transactional work (M&A, securities law, corporate finance, project finance, and
structured finance) because the responses as among those categories were not statistically
significant. See “Practice Area Data” memorandum from Casey Dwyer to the author
(April 20, 2006) (on file with author).
59
Appendix A, at A.1.
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average, both lawyer-respondents and client-respondents said that only about two percent
of contracts actually end up in litigation.60
Litigation may be rare, of course, precisely because transactional lawyers are
effectively minimizing the potential for ex post litigation. Indeed, over three-quarters of
the lawyer-respondents and almost two-thirds of the client-respondents felt that contracts
drafted by lawyers are much less likely to end up in litigation than contracts drafted by
non-lawyers.61 That explanation, however, is belied to some extent by the fact that what
is litigated is often so different from what anyone negotiating the contract anticipated.62
Almost half of all lawyer-respondents, and two-thirds of client-respondents, said that
none or at most only some63 of the issues over which contracts were litigated were
anticipated during negotiation.64 Furthermore, none of the lawyer-respondents regarded
“protecting [the] client from future litigation” as the sole primary goal of contracting.65
Although most lawyer-respondents saw that protection as an important goal,66 the only

60

See Appendix A, at A.2.
Appendix A, at A.4.
62
One could argue, of course, that the fact that what is litigated is often so different from
what anyone negotiating the contract anticipated just goes to show that, when lawyers
anticipate issues, they are able to avoid litigation (although the reality is that there are
always unanticipated issues, and these are the issues that are most often litigated).
Anecdotal evidence suggests this argument would be incomplete, however. See infra note
68 and accompanying text (suggesting that money disputes often trigger litigation
regardless of the contract terms).
63
By “some,” I mean between zero and forty percent.
64
Appendix A, at A.3. These data were unusually “lumpy.” For example, when asked
whether contracts are litigated over issues that were anticipated during negotiation, a
quarter of the lawyer-respondents said that none of those issues were anticipated,
approximately a quarter said that 41-60% of those issues were anticipated, while the
remaining lawyer-respondents gave answers that appear randomly strewn in the other
percentage categories. Id. This diverse range may well reflect that individual
transactional lawyers see their limited experience as representative, extrapolating from
inadequate data. One way to meaningfully interpret these data, however, may be to view
them in the aggregate. From that perspective, approximately 43% of contracts on average
are litigated over issues that were anticipated during negotiation. Id.
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sole primary goal they identified was creating a roadmap for the parties to follow in their
ongoing relationship.67
This suggests that the most valuable contracts might be those that
straightforwardly describe the basic business understanding. Anecdotal evidence supports
this view, suggesting that contracts may have less to do with avoiding litigation per se
and more to do about setting forth a basic business understanding, and that money
disputes often trigger litigation regardless of the contract terms.68 Thus, although
avoiding litigation is an important consideration, it may be more of a secondary
consideration.69
These findings call into question the oft-seen assumption of contract theory that
lawyers add value to the contracting process primarily by minimizing the potential for ex
post litigation.70 This in turn calls into question, at least in a business law context,
contract-theory scholarship based on that assumption. In its place, the findings suggest
the possibility of a modified paradigm for business law contracting: primarily to provide
a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing relationship, and secondarily to
minimize the potential for ex post litigation. To some extent these goals are related, in
that a clear roadmap minimizes the potential for litigation. Additionally, however, a clear
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Appendix A, at A.1 (indicating that 9.3% of lawyer-respondents see this as their sole
primary goal when drafting a contract).
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Comments of Stanley Star, Principal of Star Management Inc., to the author’s class,
Principles of Commercial & Bankruptcy Law (Nov. 4, 2005).
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Although 11.8% of the client-respondents did see protection from future litigation as
the sole primary goal that lawyers drafting contracts should seek to accomplish (see
Appendix A, at A.1), that disparity from the lawyer-survey findings may reflect that
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process oriented—in this case, to set forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in order to
achieve, among other things, protection of the client from future litigation.
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See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814 (2006) (assuming this as the primary goal of contracting).
See also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex
Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077 (2005) (generally addressing the
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roadmap not only documents the basic business understanding but also minimizes the
potential for ex post disputes that do not rise to the level of litigation.
Minimizing the potential for ex post litigation, and arguably also the potential for
non-litigated disputes, has been viewed so far as a discrete hypothesis. Conceptually,
however, it is more logically viewed (and will be discussed here) as a subset of the next
two hypotheses: reducing transaction costs and reducing regulatory costs. It is a subset of
the former to the extent transactional lawyers help avoid business issues—and a subset of
the latter to the extent transactional lawyers help avoid legal issues—that result in
litigation and other disputes.
2. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by
reducing transaction costs. The findings weakly support the second hypothesis, that
transactional lawyers add value by reducing transaction costs (namely by reducing moral
hazard by drafting transaction documents and agreements to eliminate adverse actions
due to a change in incentives; by reducing agency costs by implicitly monitoring, as
independent advocates for their client’s position, that their client’s officers act on the
client’s behalf; and by effectively reducing asymmetric information by giving legal
opinions71).
Although most lawyers and clients felt that transactional counsel should be
somewhat responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect the client against, possible
future events that could change the client’s business incentives,72 far fewer thought such
counsel should be responsible for anticipating or drafting to protect the client against
possible future events that could change the business incentives of other transaction
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See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
Appendix A, at E.2.
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parties.73 Furthermore, relatively few lawyers and far fewer clients felt that transactional
counsel monitor the client’s officers to any significant extent.74
Perhaps it is not surprising that transactional lawyers in fact add relatively little
value in these ways. There is nothing per se “legal” about the role of transactional
lawyers in reducing moral hazard; sophisticated non-lawyer scriveners also could
anticipate moral hazard and draft to avoid it, such as by negotiating and drafting an M&A
contract to eliminate a buyer’s incentive to increase current costs and thereby adjust a
deferred purchase price downward.75 Nor is there anything per se legal about the role of
transactional lawyers in agency cost monitoring, a job that independent non-lawyers
could likewise perform.76 Indeed, Professor Gilson himself has recognized that nonlawyers could—and to some extent probably do—perform these functions as well as and
at lower cost than lawyers.77
The only example in the scholarly literature of transactional lawyers using their
legal skills to reduce transaction costs is through giving legal opinions to reduce
asymmetric information between transaction parties.78 Legal opinions are
informed judgments, usually in writing, given by lawyers on issues of law.
Although legal opinions are sometimes directed to clients, in a
transactional setting legal opinions are often provided, at the request of
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significant or greater extent that their client’s officers act on the client’s behalf, and that
less than a fifth of client-respondents (6.3% ÷ 33.3%) perceive even that limited
monitoring).
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See supra note 74 and accompanying text (showing that transactional lawyers do not
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Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 254 n. 39, 298-299, &
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clients, to or for the benefit of third parties such as financiers of credit or
investors.79
Third parties commonly require legal opinions as a condition precedent to closing
business transactions to help assure that, at least insofar as those parties have
requested opinion coverage, nothing legally problematic lurks beneath the
transaction’s surface.80 Lawyers providing the opinion apply applicable law to the
transaction’s particular facts in order to reach their legal conclusions. Their
inability to deliver a requested opinion at closing signals a problem, allowing
intended opinion recipients to refuse to consummate the transaction.81
The survey findings suggest, however, that opinion-giving by transactional
lawyers may be relatively insignificant. Although time spent does not necessarily
correlate to value provided, only a small fraction—five to fifteen percent—of a
transactional lawyer’s work is involved with issuing legal opinions.82 Moreover, opiniongiving fits uneasily into the second hypothesis. The argument for its fit is that it reduces
transaction costs by reducing information asymmetry.83 But it can be misleading to say
that legal opinions reduce information asymmetry since “recipients of [legal] opinions
often have the same factual information that opining counsel has.”84 Legal opinions
actually work in a more limited sense—by applying applicable law to those facts in order
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to reach legal conclusions85—and even then the “[r]ecipient’s counsel is likely to have
the same ability to apply the law to facts as opining counsel.”86
Opinion-giving does, however, fit more naturally into the next hypothesis, that
transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs—by assessing the legal
consequences of the transaction for the parties receiving the opinion.87
3. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by
reducing regulatory costs. The findings strongly support the third hypothesis, that
transactional lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs.88 Over ninety-three percent
of transactional lawyers said their transactional work involves law to a “significant” or
“great” extent.89 Although that percentage may to some extent reflect a self-reporting
bias,90 the findings were largely confirmed by client respondents.91 These findings differ
significantly from the predictions of existing theoretical literature that transactional
lawyers add value mostly in ways that do not necessarily require legal training.92
To appreciate how transactional lawyers add value under this hypothesis, this
article distinguishes between client-regulatory legal work and transaction-regulatory legal
work.93 Although transactional counsel can add value by performing client-regulatory
legal work, there are two important limitations on that value. The first is that many
companies that engage in transactions—and therefore many clients of transactional
85
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lawyers—are not regulated entities.94 The legal work performed by those transactional
lawyers would not be client-regulatory.
The second limitation is that, even where their clients are regulated entities,
transactional lawyers do not always need to get deeply involved with the regulation. Even
when regulation is central to a transaction, the findings show that transactional lawyers
do not always feel a need to understand their clients’ regulatory concerns in detail.95 The
majority of transactional lawyers understand those concerns only to the extent needed to
know when to alert regulatory counsel—typically in-house counsel of the client96—to the
possibility of legal issues.97
Experience confirms this second limitation. Transactional lawyers representing a
bank, for example, need only become sufficiently familiar with the federal margin
regulations98 to know when to alert regulatory counsel that there may be a compliance
issue.99 Transactional counsel also are not “typically requested [to opine] on issues whose

94
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analysis would be independent of the transaction’s fact pattern.”100 This interplay of
transactional and regulatory counsel may well have evolved because the complexities of
modern regulation can make it impractical for a lawyer to gain and maintain expertise in
both regulation of a client and regulation of transactions engaged in by the client.
Consistent with those limitations, the findings suggest that transactional counsel
reduce regulatory costs, and thus add value, primarily by performing transactionregulatory legal work: by providing expertise in the law and regulations that generally
govern the transaction and by understanding the rationale for the contractual provisions in
the transaction documents.101 This expertise can include, for example, ensuring that
desired legal priorities are achieved, that security interests are properly perfected, and that
subordination agreements are enforceable; that indenture covenants are not violated and
that covenant protections adequately balance debtor and creditor needs; that commerciallaw remedies to made available upon insolvency or default work in harmony with debtorcreditor law protections; that legal entities are established in the form (e.g., corporation,
trust, partnership, limited liability company) and with the governance characteristics most
effective for the task, given such competing constraints as the tradeoff between equityholder and creditor rights, bankruptcy law, tax law, and accounting; that guaranties and
other credit supports are legally enforceable; that any special-purpose entities achieve the
applicable legal requirements of rating agencies and investors, such as “true sale,” “nonconsolidation,” and other “bankruptcy remoteness” criteria; that cross-border legal
demands are complied with; and that any securities law requirements are met.102 These
findings conflict with scholarly conclusions that transactional lawyers primarily add the
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same types of value that could be added in business transactions by any sophisticated
negotiating party, not necessarily one specially trained as a lawyer.103
4. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by
acting as reputational intermediaries. The findings weakly support the fourth
hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by acting as reputational intermediaries.
One of the main claims of this hypothesis—that much greater trust should be given to
non-legal information when the party giving that information (e.g., a company being
acquired in an M&A transaction) is represented by a reputable law firm104—was almost
unanimously rejected by transactional lawyers and clients alike.105 This rejection is
particularly significant because this hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by
acting as reputational intermediaries, is the most agreed-upon scholarly theory.106
103

See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 288-93
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To some extent, these findings should not be surprising. Aside from the
incongruity of lawyers—who, after all, do not have the highest public trust—acting as
proxies for trustworthiness, the value of a law firm as a reputational intermediary would
be expected to be proportional to the need for trustworthiness and credibility. In simple or
routine transactions, that need may be small, whereas the cost of hiring a high-reputation
law firm may be expensive.
Furthermore, even in complex or unusual transactions involving large amounts of
money, the need for trustworthiness and credibility often concerns financial, not legal,
information.107 To this end, accountants, and not lawyers, are held responsible for
certifying the accuracy of that information.108
The findings additionally reveal other limitations to the reputational intermediary
hypothesis. Contrary to theory, reputational value per se is less important than the quality
and experience provided by high-reputation transactional counsel, who add value
primarily by performing better legal work. Thus, one-hundred percent of clientfinancial capital, arguably provides an important assurance to clients that law firms will
discipline shirking and other self-interested conduct by their members.”).
107
Even to the extent the need for trustworthiness and credibility concerns legal
information, one commentator suggests that reputation alone may be insufficient. Lipson,
supra note 81, at 111 (observing that “[i]f the value of a[] [legal] opinion lies in the fact
that it is evidence that a reputable [law] firm has represented the Company, one might
also think that the most reputable firms could dispense with issuing opinions entirely. . . .
The reputation of the firm alone would suffice as a signal of probity, diligence, etc. to the
putative opinion recipient. Yet, this is not how it works out in practice. The fact that a
firm already has a top-flight reputation does not exempt the firm from having to give
opinions on behalf of its clients.”).
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Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31 J.
CORP. L. issue no. 4 (forthcoming Sept 2006) (examining the boundary between lawyer
and accountant responsibility for financial information). Even negative assurance legal
opinions (discussed supra note 104) commonly exclude legal conclusions based on
financial information. E-mail from William Widen, Associate Professor, University of
Miami School of Law, & former Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to the author (July
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exclude financial statement information from the scope of the negative assurance given to
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respondents and almost ninety-nine percent of lawyer-respondents cited experience as the
most important reason that law firms contribute to the success of a transaction.109
Reputation value by itself was a secondary consideration, along with the law firm having
smart lawyers.110 One lawyer’s comment typifies the responses: “Skill not reputation is
the key. Most lawyers don’t care about ‘firm name,’ but can quickly assess
competence.”111
Reputation also can create costs that offset value. For example, to the extent a
party to a transaction hires a high-reputation law firm, another party may feel
“outgunned” and thus hire its own high-reputation law firm, resulting in a “dollar
auction” arms race. These costs could be substantial; approximately forty-three percent of
client respondents said they would consider hiring a highly-reputed law firm simply
because the opposing party did so.112
5. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by
providing client privilege and confidentiality. The findings are mixed regarding the fifth
hypothesis, that transactional lawyers add value by providing client privilege and
confidentiality.113 While forty-four percent of client-respondents said the attorney-client
privilege provided significant value and twenty-five percent even said it provided great
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value,114 most respondents said that this privilege did not significantly facilitate
transactions or, if it did facilitate transactions, that it did so only to a small degree.115
These results can perhaps be explained by the perspective of respondents to the
questionnaire: from the standpoint of any given client, this privilege can be valuable. It is
less clear, however, that the privilege creates net overall value—value viewed here from
a broad societal perspective (and not from the standpoint of any single client).116
Even if this hypothesis accounted for a portion of transactional-lawyer value, that
portion may well fluctuate over time. There appears to be a trend, at least in the corporate
context, to narrow the attorney-client privilege.117 Also, privileges and confidentiality are
somewhat artificial and states could, if they wished, create similar privileges for nonlawyer advisers.118 This article therefore does not attach much significance to this fifth
hypothesis.
6. Findings regarding the hypothesis that transactional lawyers add value by
creating economies of scope. The findings only weakly support the sixth hypothesis, that
transactional lawyers add value through economies of scope. Recall that this hypothesis
predicts that transactional lawyers can more efficiently perform non-legal transactional
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that traditional rationales for the attorney-client privilege do not hold in the corporate
context, and that the corporate attorney-client privilege should be abolished). See also
Thomas Ross, Knowing No Other Duty: Privity, The Myth of Elitism, and the
Transformation of the Legal Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 819, 827 (1997)
(observing the extent to which state legislatures are narrowing the attorney-client
privilege).
118
Similar privileges already exist, for example, for communications between individuals
and physicians, clergymen, and therapists. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and
Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998).
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work, such as negotiating and drafting deal documentation,119 because they are already
performing the legal work. A majority of both lawyer and client respondents indeed
agreed that, at least to some extent, transactional lawyers perform non-legal work because
someone must do so and transactional lawyers are already involved.120 Almost half the
lawyer-respondents also felt that such non-legal work is, to a significant extent,
necessarily incident to their legal tasks.121 In contrast, though, most client-respondents
felt that non-legal work performed by transactional lawyers is only to some extent if at all
necessarily incident to those lawyers’ legal tasks.122
More problematically for the economy-of-scope hypothesis, the findings call into
question its hallmark—that transactional lawyers can more efficiently perform the nonlegal transactional work. Almost two-thirds of client-respondents indicated that the nonlegal work performed by transactional lawyers could be performed more efficiently by
non-lawyers.123 The findings also show that transactional lawyers usually charge at their
full rate when performing non-legal work,124 so clients pay dearly for it.125
It therefore behooves lawyers, for their integrity if not also to attempt to achieve a
true economy of scope (and, more self-interestedly, to preserve this franchise126), to
119
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perform this work as efficiently as feasible. To this end, law schools should consider
emphasizing writing and contract-drafting and negotiating skills, which business schools
(at least regarding writing and drafting) do not presently emphasize.127
This recognizes that economies of scope exist only where the same investment
supports multiple profitable activities less expensively in combination than separately.128
Utilizing transactional lawyers to negotiate and draft contracts merely because they
already are involved in examining regulatory aspects of the transaction does not ensure
that each additional activity will be performed profitably, or as profitably as such activity
would be performed by other parties. The negotiating and contracting process itself can
create, or destroy, value—the former being exemplified by the creation of personal
relationships that help build business relationships between opposing parties and the
consensus problem-solving that helps facilitate closing the business transaction to all
parties’ satisfaction.129 Where transactional lawyers do not facilitate those interpersonal
and problem-solving goals, they may well destroy the value that an economy of scope
could achieve—the ultimate manifestation of which is a lawyer who, by obstinacy or
otherwise, causes a valuable transaction to fail.130 This suggests that law schools
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additionally should consider stressing consensus problem-solving and the importance of
interpersonal relationships.
CONCLUSIONS
This article’s findings show that transactional lawyers add value, or at least say
that they add value, primarily by reducing regulatory costs. Of the two types of regulatory
costs—client-regulatory and transaction-regulatory131—transactional lawyers normally
focus on the latter. This may help explain why they usually concentrate in such
transaction-regulatory intensive areas as securities law, M&A, bank lending, structured
finance, and project finance.132
These findings present a very different picture of how business lawyers add value
than that portrayed by existing scholarship, thereby challenging the reigning models of
transactional lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” and “reputational intermediaries.”
Under those models, transactional lawyer value “rests neither on [the] inherently legal
character [of transactional lawyer work] nor … on skills acquired through traditional
legal training.”133 As a result, scholars have predicted a bleak possible vision of the
future, in which “the [legal] profession’s transactional role is reduced from engineer to
draftsman, at the expense of lawyers’ prosperity and the intellectual interest of their
work”134 due to competition with other professions, such as investment bankers and
accountants.135
That vision, however, appears flawed. If transactional lawyers provide most of
their value through their expertise in law, they are unlikely to face competition with,
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much less to be replaced by, non-legal professionals. Indeed, fewer than two percent of
lawyer-respondents and fewer than twelve percent of client-respondents felt that
transactional lawyer work could be performed by non-lawyers to any significant
extent.136 To the extent law and regulation become more pervasive in the future,
transactional lawyers will become even more uniquely valuable. Contrary to academic
claims, transactional lawyers are (and should be) secure in their professions.
This article’s findings also suggest flaws in the existing scholarly visions of how
legal education should change. Based on existing models, scholars have argued for an
increased focus on finance theory and transaction-cost economics.137 Some even claim
that teaching these economic subjects in lieu of the case method would help law students
to develop judgment.138 Although, as a professor of law and business, I regard finance
theory and transaction-cost economics as important, the findings suggest that budding
transactional lawyers would be even better served by focusing on law and on applying
legal concepts to solve real-world problems139—goals that the case method has a long
and distinguished record of helping students achieve.140 Similarly, law schools should
introduce, if not emphasize, the importance of developing good working relationships

136

Appendix A, at C.1. Athough “some” work performed by transactional lawyers might
be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers (compare Appendix A, at C.1, with
Appendix A, at C.6), most such work could not because transactional lawyers add most
of their value by reducing regulatory costs.
137
See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, supra note 7, at 304-05; Gilson
& Mnookin, supra note 8, at 3-14.
138
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 8, at 6-7 (arguing that teaching such disciplines as
“[t]ransaction cost economics” and “the economics of information” will more effectively
“send out from law school more students with judgment than just those who arrived
already possessing it.”).
139
Cf. Lipson, supra note 127.
140
This does not imply that finance and economic theory should be ignored; the question
is one of balance. Cf. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J.
LEG. ED. 342, 351 (2005) (arguing that “[m]odern finance [has] become the language of
business, and lawyers need[] to be knowledgeable about it in order to serve their
clients”). See also id. at 352 (discussing the “need for technical proficiency” in finance
and economics on the part of business lawyers).
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between opposing lawyers in business transactions.141 Perhaps Dean Kronman has been
right, after all, in emphasizing the importance of traditional case analysis over theory and
social sciences.142
This article does not claim, however, that its findings are dispositive of these
issues. Its use of survey methodology has inherent limitations.143 But it is nonetheless a
first empirical step in engaging the debate over these issues.

141

Business schools already emphasize the importance of developing good working
relationships between parties. See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics:
Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Importance, or [sic] Human Relationships in
the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1225, 1277-78 (2004) (“Although courses in
relationship skills may seem odd to those familiar with law schools, similar courses, and
numerous varieties of courses that teach teamwork, have been staples at some of the
country’s best Business Schools for decades.”); Martin E. P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil,
Terry H. Kang, Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 51 (2001) (“[L]aw
school pedagogy differs from that of business schools, where cooperative projects and
thinking are the rule in leading MBA programs.”).
142
Cf. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 225-64 (1993) (maintaining this emphasis) with Gilson & Mnookin, supra
note 8, at 7 (arguing that teaching the disciplines referred to supra note 138 “will do a far
better job [of training transactional lawyers] than the case method purveyors of Dean
Kronman’s golden age could ever have imagined”).
143
See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.

32
Addendum 1: Form of Lawyer Questionnaire

LAWYER QUESTIONNAIRE
Name:
Firm:
Position with Firm:
Location:
Area(s) of Practice:
Years of Legal Experience:

NOTICE: This questionnaire’s purpose is to help understand the value added by
outside counsel in the negotiating and contracting process leading to closing a
commercial, financial, or other business transaction. Please assume that all
questions below pertain to those types of transactions.
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation
1. When drafting a contract, what are you primarily trying to accomplish?: (a) __ setting
forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing relationship; (b) __ protecting
your client from future litigation; (c) __both of the above; (d) __ other (please specify
below).
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________.
2. Approximately what percentage of contracts that you draft eventually end up in
litigation (please specify percentage)?: ___%
3. Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues
that were anticipated during negotiation?: ___%
4. To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future
litigation than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: (a) __ much less likely; (b) __
somewhat less likely; (c) __ not less likely; (d) __ uncertain.

B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries
1. To what extent, if any, does a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a
transaction?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent;
(d) __ to a small extent or not at all.
2. If a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do
so (check all that apply)?: (a) __ such law firm is experienced in the type of transaction;
(b) __ such law firm has smart lawyers; (c) __ hiring such law firm signals
trustworthiness and credibility to other transaction parties; (d) __ hiring such law firm
signals trustworthiness and credibility to potential investors.
3. Clients should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that
apply): (a) __ in all complex or unusual transactions; (b) __ in all transactions involving
large dollar amounts; (c) __ in all transactions where the transaction parties put a
premium on trustworthiness and credibility; (d) __ in all transactions where potential
investors put a premium on trustworthiness and credibility; (e) __ in all transactions
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where opposing parties hire highly reputed law firms.
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply): (a)
__ are as willing to be hired for unusual transactions as for more typical transactions; (b)
__ are sometimes reluctant to be hired for unusual transactions; (c) __ may be biased
against innovating changes in transactions; (d) __ are not biased against innovating
changes in the transactions.
5. To what extent, if any, should parties to a transaction trust non-legal information
provided by another transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm,
as opposed to where that party is represented only by in-house counsel?: (a) __ should
trust that information much more; (b) __ should trust that information somewhat more;
(c) __ should have no greater trust in that information.

C. Creating Economies of Scope
1. To what extent could your work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?: (a)
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small
extent or not at all.
2. Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
3. To what extent do you perform that non-legal work simply because someone must,
and you already are involved in the transaction?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a
significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.
4. To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your legal tasks?: (a) __
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to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small
extent or not at all.
5. Do you charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?: __ Yes; __ No.
6. Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?: __ Yes;
__ No.
7. When negotiating a transaction, to what extent do you actively try to facilitate good
relationships with opposing counsel?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant
extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.

D. Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality
1. To what extent do you protect your client by creating an attorney-client privilege?: (a)
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small
extent or not at all.
2. To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?: (a) __
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small
extent or not at all; (e) __ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating
transactions (for example, by increasing information asymmetry among transaction
parties).

E. Reducing Transaction Costs
1. What percentage of your work on a transaction involves preparing, issuing, and/or
reviewing legal opinions?: ___ %.
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2. To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client
against, possible future events that could change your client’s business incentives?: (a)
__ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small
extent or not at all.
3. To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client
against, possible future events that could change the business incentives of other
transaction parties?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.
4. To what extent do you monitor that your client’s officers act on the client’s behalf?:
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a
small extent or not at all.

F. Reducing Regulatory Costs
1. To what extent does your work on a transaction actually involve law?: (a) __ to a
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent.
2. To what extent are your non-bank transactional clients more regulated by government
than an ordinary business corporation?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant
extent; (c) __ to a small extent; (d) __ not at all.
3. When you represent a bank or other regulated entity in a business transaction, to what
extent do you need to understand the details of that client’s particular regulatory
concerns?: (a) __ in detail; (b) __ only sufficiently to know when to alert regulatory
counsel to the possibility of legal issues; (c) __ other [please describe: ___________
___________________________________________________________________].
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4. When you represent an ordinary business corporation in a business transaction, which
of the following statements are true (mark all that are true)?: (a) __ you need to provide
expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern that type of transaction; (b) __
you need to understand the rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction
documents; (c) __ other [please describe: __________________________________
___________________________________________________________________]
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Addendum 2: Form of Client Questionnaire

CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Name:
Company:
Position with Company:
Location:
Area(s) of Responsibility:
Years of Experience:

NOTICE: This questionnaire’s purpose is to help understand the value added by
outside counsel in the negotiating and contracting process leading to closing a
commercial, financial, or other business transaction. Please assume that all
questions below pertain to those types of transactions.
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation
1. When you hire lawyers to draft a contract, what do you want them to primarily
accomplish?: (a) __ to set forth a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing
relationship; (b) __ to protect your company from future litigation; (c)__ both of the
above; (d) __ other (please specify below).
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________.
2. Approximately what percentage of your contracts eventually end up in litigation
(please specify percentage)?: ___%
3. Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues
that were anticipated during negotiation?: ___%
4. To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future
litigation than contracts drafted without using lawyers?: (a) __ much less likely; (b) __
somewhat less likely; (c) __ not less likely; (d) __ uncertain.

B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries
1. To what extent, if any, does hiring a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success
of a transaction?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.
2. If hiring a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why
might it do so (check all that apply)?: (a) __ such law firm is experienced in the type of
transaction; (b) __ such law firm has smart lawyers; (c) __ hiring such law firm signals
trustworthiness and credibility to other transaction parties; (d) __ hiring such law firm
signals trustworthiness and credibility to potential investors.
3. One should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that apply):
(a) __ in all complex or unusual transactions; (b) __ in all transactions involving large
dollar amounts; (c) __ in all transactions where the transaction parties put a premium on
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trustworthiness and credibility; (d) __ in all transactions where potential investors put a
premium on trustworthiness and credibility; (e) __ in all transactions where opposing
parties hire highly reputed law firms.
4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply): (a)
__ are as willing to be hired for unusual transactions as for more typical transactions; (b)
__ are sometimes reluctant to be hired for unusual transactions; (c) __ may be biased
against innovating changes in transactions; (d) __ are not biased against innovating
changes in the transactions.
5. To what extent, if any, do you trust non-legal information provided by another
transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm, as opposed to where
that party is represented only by in-house counsel?: (a) __ trust that information much
more; (b) __ trust that information somewhat more; (c) __ no greater trust in that
information.
C. Creating Economies of Scope
1. To what extent could your lawyer’s work on a transaction be performed by a nonlawyer?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d)
__ to a small extent or not at all.
2. Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
3. To what extent does your lawyer perform that non-legal work simply because
someone must, and your lawyer already is involved in the transaction?: (a) __ to a great
extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not
at all.
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4. To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your lawyer’s legal
tasks?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __
to a small extent or not at all.
5. Does your lawyer charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?: __ Yes; __ No.
6. Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?: __ Yes;
__ No.
7. To what extent does involving your lawyer in that non-legal work add value by
providing third-party objectivity?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent;
(c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.
8. To what extent do you want your lawyer, when negotiating a transaction, to facilitate
good relationships with opposing counsel?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant
extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.

D. Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality
1. To what extent do you value the protection provided by the attorney-client privilege?:
(a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a
small extent or not at all.
2. To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?: (a) __
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small
extent or not at all; (e) __ the attorney-client privilege works against facilitating
transactions (for example, by increasing information asymmetry among transaction
parties).
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E. Reducing Transaction Costs
1. What percentage of your lawyer’s work on a transaction involves preparing and
issuing legal opinions?: ___ %.
2. To what extent is your lawyer responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect you
against, possible future events that could change your business incentives?: (a) __ to a
great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some extent; (d) __ to a small extent
or not at all.
3. To what extent is your lawyer responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect you
against, possible future events that could change the business incentives of other
transaction parties?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.
4. To what extent does your lawyer monitor that your company’s officers act on the
company’s behalf?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to some
extent; (d) __ to a small extent or not at all.

F. Reducing Regulatory Costs
1. To what extent does your lawyer’s work on a transaction actually involve law?: (a) __
to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a small extent.
2. To what extent is your company more regulated by government than an ordinary
business corporation?: (a) __ to a great extent; (b) __ to a significant extent; (c) __ to a
small extent; (d) __ not at all.
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3. When you hire outside lawyers to work on a business transaction, to what extent
should they need to understand the details of your company’s particular regulatory
concerns?: (a) __ in detail; (b) __ only sufficiently to know when to alert your
company’s regulatory counsel to the possibility of legal issues.
4. When you hire outside lawyers to work on a business transaction, which of the
following statements are true (mark all that are true)?: (a) __ they should provide
expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern that type of transaction; (b) __
they should understand the rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction
documents.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE DATA UNDERLYING THIS ARTICLE’S
FINDINGS
A. Minimizing Potential for Ex Post Litigation
1. When drafting a contract, what are you primarily trying to accomplish?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients144
(n=17)

(n=28)
(a) Setting forth a roadmap
for the parties to follow in

9.3 %

3.6 %

3.7 %

25.0%

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0%

11.8 %

(c) both of the above

84.0 %

89.3 %

92.6 %

65.0 %

88.2 %

(d) other

32.0 %

35.7 %

37.0 %

20.0 %

11.8 %

their ongoing relationship
(b) protecting your client
from future litigation

2. Approximately what percentage of contracts that you draft eventually end up in
litigation (please specify percentage)?: ___%
Lawyers
New York Philadelphia

(n=74)

(n=27)

(n=27)

Chicago Clients
(n=17)
(n=20)

Average

2.06 %

1.65 %

2.26 %

2.33 %

1.24 %

Median

1.0 %

1.0 %

1.0 %

1.0 %

1.0 %

Overall

144

The wording of the client question and possible answers varied slightly. See
Addendum 2 (Form of Client Questionnaire).
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Standard Deviation

3.33

2.64

3.16

4.37

2.36

3. Approximately what percentage of those litigated contracts are litigated over issues
that were anticipated during negotiation?:

Overall

Lawyers
New York Philadelphia

Chicago

Clients
(n=12)

(n=55)145

(n=19)

(n=17)

(n=19)

0

25.5 %

31.6%

23.5 %

21.1 %

50.0%

1-20

10.9 %

0.0 %

11.8%

21.1 %

16.7%

21-40

7.3 %

5.3 %

11.8 %

5.3 %

0.0%

41-60

27.3 %

36.8 %

17.6 %

26.3 %

33.3%

61-80

9.1 %

10.5 %

11.8 %

10.5 %

0.0%

81-99

3.6 %

0.0 %

11.8 %

0.0 %

0.0%

100

16.4 %

15.8 %

17.6 %

15.8 %

0.0%

Average

43.71 %

43.95 %

47.41 %

40.16 %

17.17 %

Median

50 %

50 %

50 %

50 %

0.50 %

Standard Deviation

36.92

36.31

40.01

36.36

24.30

4. To what extent, if any, are lawyer-drafted contracts less likely to result in future
litigation than contracts drafted without using lawyers?:

145

The low response rate to this question stems from the fact that most who answered
zero to Question A.2 found this question non-applicable.
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=72)

York

(n=26)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=14)

(n=26 )
(a) Much less likely

80.6 %

84.6 %

76.9 %

80.0 %

64.3 %

(b) Somewhat less likely

9.7 %

3.9 %

11.5 %

15.0 %

28.6 %

(c) Not less likely

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

(d) Uncertain

11.1 %

11.5 %

15.4 %

5.0 %

7.1%

B. Acting as Reputational Intermediaries
1. To what extent, if any, does a highly reputed law firm contribute to the success of a
transaction?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=74 )

York

(n=27)

(n=19)

Clients
(n=16)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

47.3 %

46.4 %

51.9 %

42.1 %

25.0 %

(b) To a significant extent

41.9 %

42.9 %

33.3 %

52.6 %

37.5 %

(c) To some extent

10.8 %

10.7 %

14.8 %

5.3 %

18.8 %

1.4 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

5.3 %

18.8 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all

2. If a highly reputed law firm contributes to the success of a transaction, why might it do
so (check all that apply)?:
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=14)

(n=28)
(a) Such law firm is
experienced in the type of

98.7 %

100.0 %

96.3 %

100.0 %

100.0%

73.3 %

75.0 %

66.7 %

80.0 %

57.1 %

81.3 %

82.1 %

85.2 %

75.0 %

71.4 %

74.7 %

75.0 %

77.8 %

70.0 %

42.9 %

transaction
(b) Such law firm has smart
lawyers
(c) Hiring such law firm
signals trustworthiness and
credibility to other
transaction parties
(d) Hiring such law firm
signals trustworthiness and
credibility to potential
investors

3. Clients should seriously consider hiring a highly reputed law firm (check all that
apply):
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=74)

York

(n=26)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=14)

(n=28)
(a) In all complex or unusual
transactions
(b) In all transactions
involving large dollar

98.6 %

100.0 %

96.2 %

100.0 %

85.7 %

68.9 %

71.4 %

76.9 %

55.0 %

64.3 %
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amounts
(c) In all transactions where
the transaction parties put a
premium on trustworthiness

62.2 %

64.3 %

80.8 %

35.0 %

62.2 %

60.7 %

76.9 %

45.0 %

44.6 %

53.6 %

42.3 %

35.0 %

42.9 %

and credibility
(d) In all transactions where
potential investors put a
premium on trustworthiness

57.1 %

and credibility
(e) In all transactions where
opposing parties hire highly

42.9 %

reputed law firms

4. Assuming no conflicts of interest, highly reputed law firms (check all that apply):
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=72)

York

(n=27)

(n= 19)

Clients
(n=16)

(n=26)
(a) Are as willing to be hired
for unusual transactions as

90.3 %

92.3 %

88.9 %

89.5 %

100.0 %

8.3 %

7.7 %

11.1 %

5.3 %

0.0 %

9.7 %

3.9 %

14.8 %

10.5 %

12.5 %

83.3 %

96.2 %

74.1 %

78.9 %

for more typical transactions
(b) Are sometimes reluctant
to be hired for unusual
transactions
(c) May be biased against
innovating changes in
transactions
(d) Are not biased against

68.9 %
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innovating changes in the
transactions

5. To what extent, if any, should parties to a transaction trust non-legal information
provided by another transaction party if that party is represented by a reputable law firm,
as opposed to where that party is represented only by in-house counsel?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=28)
(a) Should trust that
information much more
(b) Should trust that
information somewhat more
(c) Should have no greater
trust in that information

1.3 %

3.6 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

30.7 %

25.0 %

29.6 %

40.0 %

17.7 %

68.0 %

71.4%

70.4 %

60.0 %

82.4 %

C. Creating Economies of Scope
1. To what extent could your work on a transaction be performed by a non-lawyer?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=74)

York

(n=26)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

5.9 %

(b) To a significant extent

1.4 %

3.6 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

5.9 %
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(c) To some extent
(d) To a small extent or not
at all

45.9 %
52.7 %

39.3 %
57.1 %

50.0 %

50.0 %

58.8 %

50.0 %

50.0 %

29.4 %

2. Please briefly describe any non-legal work that falls under this category:
3. To what extent do you perform that non-legal work simply because someone must,
and you already are involved in the transaction?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=15)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

8.0 %

3.6 %

11.1 %

10.0 %

13.3 %

(b) To a significant extent

22.7 %

28.6 %

14.8 %

25.0 %

13.3 %

(c) To some extent

28.0 %

21.4 %

25.9 %

40.0 %

33.3 %

48.1 %

25.0 %

40.0 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all

41.3 %

46.4 %

4. To what extent is that non-legal work necessarily incident to your legal tasks?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=14)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

24.0 %

32.1 %

22.2 %

15.0 %

0.0 %

(b) To a significant extent

24.0 %

17.9 %

25.9 %

30.0 %

21.4 %

(c) To some extent

33.3 %

32.1 %

29.6 %

40.0 %

50.0 %
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(d) To a small extent or not
at all

18.7 %

17.9 %

22.2 %

15.0 %

28.6 %

Clients
(n=14)

5. Do you charge at the same rate for that non-legal work?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=71)

York

(n=25)

(n=20)

(n=26)
Yes

90.1 %

96.2 %

84.0%

90.0 %

84.6 %

No

9.9 %

3.9 %

16.0%

10.0 %

15.4 %

6. Could that non-legal work be performed more efficiently by non-lawyers?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20 )

Clients
(n=17)

(n=28)
Yes

41.3 %

39.3 %

37.0 %

50.0 %

64.7 %

No

42.7 %

42.9 %

37.0 %

50.0 %

17.6 %

Not Answered

16.0 %

17.9 %

0.0 %

17.6 %

26.0 %

7. When negotiating a transaction, to what extent do you actively try to facilitate good
relationships with opposing counsel?:
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=16)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

66.7 %

67.9 %

66.7 %

65.0 %

37.5 %

(b) To a significant extent

28.0 %

28.6 %

22.2 %

35.0 %

31.3 %

5.3 %

3.6 %

11.1 %

0.0 %

31.3 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

(c) To some extent
(d) To a small extent or not
at all

0.0 %

0.0 %

8. (Question for clients only) To what extent does involving your lawyer in that nonlegal work add value by providing third-party objectivity?
Clients
(n=14)
(a) To a great extent

0.0 %

(b) To a significant extent

0.0 %

(c) To some extent

35.7 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all

64.3 %

D. Creating Client Privilege and Confidentiality
1. To what extent do you protect your client by creating an attorney-client privilege?:
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=16)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

42.7 %

46.4 %

63.0 %

10.0 %

25.0 %

(b) To a significant extent

24.0 %

17.9 %

11.1 %

50.0 %

43.8 %

(c) To some extent

29.3 %

25.9 %

40.0 %

31.3 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all

4.0 %

25.0 %
10.7 %

2. To what extent does the attorney-client privilege help facilitate transactions?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=16)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

12.0 %

7.1 %

25.9 %

0.0 %

12.5 %

(b) To a significant extent

13.3 %

14.3 %

18.5 %

5.0 %

12.5 %

(c) To some extent

34.7 %

28.6 %

29.6 %

50.0 %

37.5 %

40.0 %

50.0 %

25.9 %

45.0 %

37.5 %

1.3 %

3.6 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all
(e) The attorney-client
privilege works against
facilitating transactions (for
example, by increasing
information asymmetry
among transaction parties)

E. Reducing Transaction Costs
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1. What percentage of your work on a transaction involves preparing, issuing, and/or
reviewing legal opinions?:

Overall

Lawyers
New York Philadelphia

Chicago Clients
(n= 16)
(n=20)

(n=75)

(n=28)

(n=27)

Average

6.47 %

6.10 %

7.56 %

5.53 %

14.6 %

Median

5%

5%

5%

5%

10.0 %

Standard Deviation

4.80

4.14

6.23

3.08

13.3

2. To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client
against, possible future events that could change your client’s business incentives?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=74)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=27)
(a) To a great extent

50.0 %

48.2%

51.9 %

50.0 %

41.2 %

(b) To a significant extent

28.4 %

33.3 %

25.9 %

25.0 %

35.3 %

(c) To some extent

20.3 %

14.8 %

22.2 %

25.0 %

17.7 %

1.4 %

3.7 %

0.0 %

0.0 %

5.9 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all

3. To what extent are you responsible for anticipating, and drafting to protect your client
against, possible future events that could change the business incentives of other
transaction parties?:
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=72)

York

(n=26)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=26)
(a) To a great extent

25.0 %

26.9 %

34.6 %

10.0 %

29.4 %

(b) To a significant extent

25.0 %

26.9 %

19.2%

30.0 %

11.8 %

(c) To some extent

33.3 %

34.6 %

30.8 %

35.0 %

35.3 %

15.4 %

25.0 %

23.5 %

(d) To a small extent or not

16.7 %

at all

11.5 %

4. To what extent do you monitor that your client’s officers act on the client’s behalf?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=75)

York

(n=27)

(n= 20)

Clients
(n=16)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

9.3 %

14.3 %

3.7 %

10.0 %

0.0 %

(b) To a significant extent

24.0 %

21.4 %

25.9 %

25.0 %

6.3 %

(c) To some extent

36.0 %

32.1 %

40.7 %

35.0 %

31.3 %

30.7 %

32.1 %

29.6 %

30.0 %

62.5 %

(d) To a small extent or not
at all

F. Reducing Regulatory Costs
1. To what extent does your work on a transaction actually involve law?:
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=74)

York

(n=26)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=28)
(a) To a great extent

23.0 %

21.4 %

19.2 % %

30.0 %

17.7 %

(b) To a significant extent

70.3 %

75.0 %

65.4 %

70.0 %

58.8 %

(c) To a small extent

6.8 %

3.6 %

15.4 %

0.0 %

23.5 %

2. To what extent are your non-bank transactional clients more regulated by government
than an ordinary business corporation?
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=73)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=26)
(a) To a great extent

8.2%

11.5 %

11.0 %

0.0 %

29.4 %

(b) To a significant extent

20.5 %

26.9 %

18.5 %

15.0 %

29.4 %

(c) To a small extent

54.8 %

53.9 %

55.6 %

55.0 %

23.5 %

(d) Not at all

16.4 %

7.7 %

14.8 %

30.0 %

17.7 %

3. When you represent a bank or other regulated entity in a business transaction, to what
extent do you need to understand the details of that client’s particular regulatory
concerns?:
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Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=71)

York

(n=26)

(n=18)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=27)
(a) In detail

32.4 %

33.3 %

42.3 %

16.7 %

47.1 %

56.3 %

63.0 %

34.6 %

77.8 %

52.9 %

9.9 %

3.7 %

19.2 %

5.6 %

n/a

(b) Only sufficiently to know
when to alert regulatory
counsel to the possibility of
legal issues
(c) Other

4. When you represent an ordinary business corporation in a business transaction, which
of the following statements are true (mark all that are true)?:
Lawyers
Overall

New

Philadelphia Chicago

(n=74)

York

(n=27)

(n=20)

Clients
(n=17)

(n=27)
(a) You need to provide
expertise in the law and
regulations that generally

93.2 %

88.9 %

92.6 %

100.0 %

94.1 %

97.3 %

100.0 %

96.3 %

95.0 %

88.2 %

29.7 %

22.2 %

33.3 %

35.0 %

n/a

govern that type of
transaction
(b) You need to understand
the rationale for the
contractual provisions in the
transaction documents
(c) Other

